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Abstract
A popular approach to modeling ambiguity aversion is to decom-
pose preferences into the subjective expected utility of an act and
an ambiguity index, or an adjustment factor, or a dispersion func-
tion. However, in these approaches the dispersion function (or ambi-
guity index, or adjustment factor) has very little structure imposed
on it, leaving the selection of a specific dispersion function in applica-
tions to be rather arbitrary. In this note, working in the Anscombe-
Aumann (1963) framework, we provide a simpler axiomatic characteri-
zation of mean-dispersion preferences which uniquely identifies the dis-
persion function from the infinite class of possible alternatives. Given
the representation, we also obtain unique identification of subjective
probabilities.
JEL classification: D81.
Keywords: ambiguity aversion, translation invariance, dispersion, un-
certainty, probabilistic sophistication.
1 Introduction
One popular approach to modeling attitudes toward ambiguity is to decom-
pose preferences into the expected utility of an act and an ambiguity in-
dex (Maccheroni et al., 2006a,b), or an adjustment factor (Siniscalchi, 2009),
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or a dispersion function (Grant and Polak, 2013). The most general of
these specifications is the class of mean-dispersion preferences, axiomatized
in the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework by Grant and Polak (2013).
The mean-dispersion class is quite large and includes the multiple priors
model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler,
1989), invariant bi-separable preferences (Ghirardato et al., 2004), the varia-
tional representation of preferences (Maccheroni et al., 2006a,b), and vector
expected utility (Siniscalchi, 2009), as special cases. Mean-dispersion prefer-
ences, as characterized by Grant and Polak (2013) can be represented as:
V (f, pi) = µ(f, pi)− ρ(d(f, pi)),
where µ(f, pi) is the mean utility of act f with respect to a vector proba-
bility distribution pi across all states of nature; and d(f, pi) is the vector of
deviations from the mean utility (i.e, ds := µ(f, pi)−U(f(s)), where U(f(s))
is the expected utility of f in state s). The function ρ(·) is a measure of
(aversion to) dispersion. While the generality of a representation theorem is
very desirable, Grant and Polak (2013) comment that their main theorem is
“too general to be very useful (p. 1367). In particular, “any probability
pi in ∆(S) is associated with a mean-dispersion representation of the prefer-
ences (Grant and Polak, 2013, p. 1367). In addition, the dispersion function
in the Grant-Polak representation, like the ambiguity index for variational
preferences and the adjustment factor in vector expected utility has very little
structure imposed on it1. Grant and Polak (2013) remark, “Typically, we will
be interested in mean-dispersion preferences that at least partially tie down
the admissible probabilities and that put more structure on the dispersion
functions (p. 1367). Indeed, even if one found that the axioms of variational
preferences, or vector expected utility preferences, or mean-dispersion pref-
erences are satisfied, one would be at a loss to determine which dispersion
measure to use in applications, and the choice of any particular dispersion
measure would be rather arbitrary.
In this note, working in the Anscombe-Aumann framework, we provide
a simpler axiomatic characterization of mean-dispersion preferences, which
uniquely selects the dispersion function from an infinite class of possible alter-
natives and which uniquely determines the subjective probability distribution
1Siniscalchi (2009) does provide a sharp representation of vector expected utility pref-
erences in which the adjustment factor is pinned down up to rotations.
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over states. In particular, we characterize preferences of the form:
f  g iff V (f, pi) > V (g, pi), (1)
where
V (f, pi) := µ(f, pi)− ρr(f, pi), (2)
and
r(f, pi) :=
1
2
∑
s∈S
pis |µ(f, pi)− U(f(s))| ,
where ρ is a scalar in [−1, 1] and represents a continuous index that captures
the decision maker’s attitude toward utility dispersion across states, ranging
from very dispersion-seeking (ρ = −1) to very dispersion averse (ρ = 1).
Alternatively, ρ may be interpreted as an index of ambiguity attitude, and
this interpretation is supported by our analysis in Section 5. As we establish
at the end of Section 3, if the representation (1) is unbounded and ρ is
in [0, 1], then pi is unique and the preferences in (1) also admit a vector
expected utility representation, an invariant bi-separable representation, and
a multiple priors representation.
To obtain the representation in (1), we introduce the notion of perturbed
lotteries to account for a decision maker’s aversion to the risk that the true
state is undesirable. Using the perturbed lotteries, well-established axioms
in the literature (see Axioms 1 through 6 below), and one new axiom re-
lating preferences among regular acts to preferences among perturbed acts
(Axiom 7), we are able to obtain representation (1).
A somewhat different mean-dispersion model has been developed in a
companion paper (Schneider and Nunez, 2015), in which a parallel approach
to that of Klibanoff et al. (2005) is followed through the use of second order
acts. In addition, the paper in Schneider and Nunez (2015) explicitly assumes
the existence of the coefficient in the dispersion function. There is some con-
cern in the literature that the use of second-order acts is problematic since
second-order acts may not be observable. Al-Najjar and De Castro (2010)
formalize this concern and show that there is “no verification mechanism
to determine what the decision maker receives under a second-order act ...
even in idealized repeated experiments where infinite data can be observed.
As such, there has been considerable work aimed at axiomatizing a smooth
ambiguity aversion model as in Klibanoff et al. (2005) but without relying
on second-order acts. Other axiomatic characterizations of second order ex-
pected utility have been provided in many alternative setups including Nau
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(2006), Ergin and Gul (2009), Grant et al. (2009), Seo (2009), and Neil-
son (2010). For the same reason, it is desirable to axiomatize a model of
mean-dispersion preferences that uniquely identifies the dispersion function
without invoking second-order acts.
In this note, we show that it is possible to axiomatize a model of mean-
dispersion preferences which uniquely derives the dispersion function and the
coefficient representing attitudes toward dispersion, and which uniquely de-
termines the subjective prior over states in the standard Anscombe-Aumann
setting. This approach also makes the proof more involved than in the paper
by Schneider and Nunez (2015). Moreover, we arrive at our representation
using standard axioms in the literature plus one new axiom. We thereby
provide a model which uniquely characterizes the dispersion function, in con-
trast to more general approaches in Maccheroni et al. (2006a,b), Siniscalchi
(2009), and Grant and Polak (2013), which admit an infinite set of possible
dispersion measures and so are difficult to specify in applications.
Sections 2 and 3 develop an axiomatic foundation for preferences in (1),
where the absolute deviation dispersion function r(f, pi), the existence, unique-
ness, and range of ρ, and the uniqueness of pi, can be derived from the axioms.
Section 4 designs a simple behavioral test of our new axiom, “bounded am-
biguity preference. We show that the model explains aversion to ambiguity
in Ellsberg’s paradoxes in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Objective and Subjective Lotteries
We work in the classical setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Let X
denote a set of outcomes with at least two elements. An objective lottery, p :
X → [0, 1], is a finite support probability distribution over outcomes. That
is, p(x) = 0 for all but a finite number of outcomes in X and
∑
x∈X p(x) = 1.
We denote by ∆(X) the set of objective lotteries and assume that it is a
mixture space. As usual, a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is an
application U : ∆(X)→ R defined as
U(p) :=
∑
x∈X
p(x)u(x), (3)
where u : X → R is a utility function on the outcomes set.
Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} be a finite nonempty set representing all possible
states of nature. We define a subjective lottery or act f as any mapping
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f : S → ∆(X). We will use both f(s) and fs to denote the value of f at state
s. Notice that fs(x) ∈ [0, 1] for all s ∈ S and x ∈ X, and
∑
x∈X fs(x) = 1 for
all s ∈ S. We denote the set of subjective lotteries (acts) by F and assume
that it is a mixture space. The set of probability vectors on S is denoted
by ∆(S). Given a utility function u : X → R and pi ∈ ∆(S), we denote by
µ(f, pi) the mean utility of the subjective lottery f in F . That is,
µ(f, pi) :=
∑
s∈S
pisU(f(s)) =
∑
s∈S
∑
x∈X
pisfs(x)u(x). (4)
We denote by “ ⊂ F × F a binary relation over F . The relation 
is called a preference relation if it is asymmetric and negatively transitive,
and in that case, we say that f is preferred to g if f  g. We say that f is
weakly preferred to g, denoted as f % g, if g 6 f . Moreover, we say that f
is indifferent to g, denoted as f ∼ g, if f 6 g and g 6 f . Observe that if 
is a preference relation, then for all f and g exactly one of f  g, g  f , or
f ∼ g holds; and % is a complete and transitive relation (Kreps, 1988).
A constant act f is a subjective lottery that yields the same objective
lottery in each state of nature: f(s) = p for all s ∈ S, where p ∈ ∆(X)
is an objective lottery. In this case, and when the context is clear, we also
let p ∈ ∆(X) denote the corresponding constant subjective lottery. Accord-
ingly, we can naturally extend the preference relation to ∆(X) by letting
p  q, for p, q ∈ ∆(X), whenever the constant act yielding lottery p for all
states is strictly preferred to the constant act yielding lottery q for all states.
Furthermore, a degenerate objective lottery that yields outcome x ∈ X with
probability 1 is, once again abusing notation, denoted by x. Hence, we de-
note x  y for x, y ∈ X when outcome x is preferred to outcome y. Clearly,
for a constant act p, µ(p, pi) = U(p) for all pi.
We state the following axioms, which will be used in establishing our main
result:
Axiom 1 (Preference)  on F is a preference relation.
Axiom 2 (Continuity) For every f, g, h ∈ F , the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] : αf +(1−
α)g % h} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : h % αf + (1− α)g} are closed.
Axiom 3 (Constant act independence) p  p′ in ∆(X) implies αp + (1 −
α)q  αp′ + (1− α)q for all q ∈ ∆(X) and α ∈ (0, 1].
5
Axiom 4 (Non-degeneracy) There exist f and g in F such that f  g.
Axioms 1, 2, and 4 are standard and well understood. Axiom 3 is a
classical axiom in the context of objective lotteries and a weak version of
the certainty independence axiom for acts used by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) and Ghirardato et al. (2004). The axioms together yield the classical
von Neumann-Morgenstern representation theorem when restricted to the
set ∆(X) of objective lotteries:
Theorem 1 If relation  satisfies Axioms 1 through 4, then there exists a
nonconstant affine function u : X → R such that
p  q if and only if U(p) > U(q) (5)
for all p, q ∈ ∆(X).
3 Perturbed Lotteries and Mean-Dispersion
Preferences
Given pi ∈ ∆(S) and f ∈ F , we let fpi denote the objective lottery obtained
from averaging all the objective lotteries in act f . That is,
fpi :=
∑
s∈S
pisf(s).
Using the average lottery from f , we can partition S into two sets Spi(f) and
Spi(f) as follows
Spi(f) := {s′ ∈ S : f(s′) % fpi} ,
and Spi(f) := S\Spi(f). In other words, we partition the state set S into a set
of “desirable states Spi(f), i.e., states that, under act f , have an associated
objective lottery that the decision maker would prefer, or remain indifferent,
to the objective lottery obtained by averaging with respect to pi all of the
objective lotteries defined by the act; and “undesirable states Spi(f), i.e.,
the remaining states in S.
Define
api(f) :=
∑
s∈Spi(f)
pis,
api(f) := 1− api(f).
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The probability api(f) corresponds to the likelihood of choosing an arbitrary
desirable state according to distribution pi and subjective lottery f ; and api(f)
is the complementary probability of api(f).
We further define the following objective lotteries associated with f and
pi:
f
pi
:= (1− api(f))
∑
s∈Spi(f)
pisf(s) + (1 + api(f))
∑
s∈Spi(f)
pisf(s);
fpi := (1 + api(f))
∑
s∈Spi(f)
pisf(s) + (1− api(f))
∑
s∈Spi(f)
pisf(s);
fρ,pi := (1− ρapi(f))
∑
s∈Spi(f)
pisf(s) + (1 + ρapi(f))
∑
s∈Spi(f)
pisf(s);
where ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Clearly, f
pi
and fpi are obtained from fρ,pi by taking ρ = 1
and ρ = −1, respectively. Notice that U(fpi) = µ(f, pi) and fpi = f0,pi. Con-
stant acts f
pi
and fpi correspond to risk-averse and risk-loving perturbations
of fpi, respectively. The constant act fρ,pi corresponds to a perturbation of fpi
“in-between f
pi
and fpi depending on the value of ρ. In the risk-averse per-
turbation (ρ = 1), the decision maker is averse to the risk that the true state
is undesirable and places less weight on the probability of a desirable state
relative to the likelihood that an undesirable state obtains. This observation
holds more generally for ρ in (0, 1]. When ρ is in [−1, 0), the perturbation
works in the opposite direction.
To check that fρ,pi ∈ ∆(X), notice that∑
x∈X
fρ,pi(x) = (1− ρa)
∑
x∈X
∑
s∈S
pisfs(x) + (1 + ρa)
∑
x∈X
∑
s∈S
pisfs(x)
= (1− ρa)
∑
s∈S
pis + (1 + ρa)
∑
s∈S
pis
= (1− ρa) a+ (1 + ρa) a = 1,
where we have omitted the dependence on f and pi to simplify the expressions.
Notice that if f is a constant subjective lottery, that is, there is an objec-
tive lottery p ∈ ∆(X) such that f(s) = p for all s ∈ S, then Spi(f) = S and
Spi(f) = ∅. Therefore, api(f) = 1, api(f) = 0, and fρ,pi = p for all ρ and pi.
We next state Axioms 5-7 to be used in our representation in Proposi-
tion 1.
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Axiom 5 (Certainty betweenness) For f ∈ F , p ∈ ∆(X), and any α ∈
(0, 1), f ∼ p implies f ∼ αf + (1− α)p ∼ p.
Axiom 6 (Substitution) For f, g ∈ F , f(s) ∼ g(s) for all s ∈ S implies
f ∼ g.
Axiom 7 (Bounded ambiguity preference) There exists pi ∈ ∆(S), pi > 0,
such that fpi % f % fpi for all f ∈ F .
Axiom 5 was introduced by Grant and Polak (2013) and it is related to
Gilboa and Schmeidler’s certainty independence axiom (Gilboa and Schmei-
dler, 1989) as part of their multiple-prior model. Axiom 6 was also discussed
by Grant and Polak (2013) and it is a weaker version of the standard mono-
tonicity axiom.
Axiom 7 states that there exists at least one scenario pi under which the
decision maker will always prefer a lottery fpi, where desirable states receive
a higher weight, over corresponding act f ; and will always prefer act f over a
lottery f
pi
, where undesirable states receive a higher weight. In other words,
Axiom 7 says that, given a distribution pi in ∆(S), and act f in F , the best
perturbed lottery which can be derived from f with respect to pi (the one with
the highest probability that a desirable state obtains) is weakly preferred to
f , which is weakly preferred to the worst perturbed lottery which can be
derived from f with respect to pi (the one with the lowest probability that a
desirable state obtains). A simple behavioral test of Axiom 7 is developed in
Section 4.
The bounded ambiguity preference axiom can also be interpreted as im-
plying that ambiguity preference is bounded for each act. That is, for each
act, there is a corresponding unambiguous lottery which is preferred to the
act and there is an unambiguous lottery such that the act is preferred to that
lottery. This captures the intuition that preferences switch from preferring an
unambiguous lottery to preferring an ambiguous act when the unambiguous
lottery becomes sufficiently unattractive. Under Axiom 7, a decision maker
is thus averse to ambiguity when the objective lottery places a high weight
on desirable states (and he thus thinks it unlikely that the act will do better),
but prefers the ambiguous act when the objective lottery places a low weight
on desirable states (and thus he thinks it likely that the act will do better).
Using Axioms 1-7, we next derive a mean-dispersion measure across
states. This measure will represent the decision maker’s preferences among
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subjective lotteries. To do so, we first define the mean absolute semideviation
of the utility of f ∈ F across states as
r(f, pi) :=
∑
s∈S,U(f(s))<µ(f,pi)
pis [µ(f, pi)− U(f(s))] . (6)
Notice that from the well-known result∑
k
|βk| =
∑
k,βk>0
βk −
∑
k,βk<0
βk,
for any real vector (β1, . . . , βn), it follows that r(f, pi) can be also expressed
as
r(f, pi) =
1
2
∑
s∈S
pis |µ(f, pi)− U(f(s))| .
Using this definition, we introduce the concept of a mean-dispersion repre-
sentation across states.
Definition 1 A mean-dispersion representation across states is a given tuple
(u, pi, ρ, V ), where u : X → R is a utility function; pi ∈ ∆(S) is a probability
vector over S; ρ is a real number in [−1, 1]; and preferences over subjective
lotteries are given by
V (f) := µ(f, pi)− ρr(f, pi) (7)
for all f ∈ F .
The following lemma is very useful in establishing a mean-dispersion rep-
resentation.
Lemma 1 For every f ∈ F , pi ∈ ∆(S), and ρ ∈ [−1, 1], the following
identity holds:
U(fρ,pi) = µ(f, pi)− ρr(f, pi) = V (f).
Proof. See Appendix.
It also follows from the lemma that V is a linear non-increasing function
of ρ ∈ [−1, 1], for fixed u and pi. Using the lemma together with Theorem 1,
it is easy to see that
fpi % fρ,pi % fpi, (8)
9
and in particular,
fpi % fpi % fpi, (9)
for all f ∈ F .
Now, combining Theorem 1 and Axioms 1-7, we obtain our main result
from this section:
Proposition 1 The relation  on F satisfies Axioms 1 through 7 if and only
if there exist pi ∈ ∆(S) and ρ ∈ [−1, 1] such that  admits a mean-dispersion
representation (u, pi, ρ, V ) where
f  g if and only if V (f) > V (g), (10)
for all f, g ∈ F . The utility function u is nonconstant and unique up to a pos-
itive linear transformation, and ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Moreover, if there exists f such
that r(f, pi) > 0, then ρ is unique. That is, if there is another representation
(u′, pi, ρ′, V ′) for pi, then ρ = ρ′.
Proof. See Appendix.
The next result establishes additional properties of the mean-dispersion
representation. Properties 2 and 3 in Proposition 2 are introduced as axioms
by Grant and Polak (2013) and are required for the proof of Proposition 3
below.
Proposition 2 If the relation  on F admits a mean-dispersion representa-
tion (u, pi, ρ, V ) with V as in (7) and ρ ∈ [0, 1], then the following properties
hold:
1. (Monotonicity) For every f, g ∈ F , f(s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S implies
f % g.
2. (Constant absolute uncertainty aversion) For any f ∈ F , any three
constant acts p, q and p′, and any α ∈ (0, 1)
αf + (1− α)p % αp′ + (1− α)p⇒ αf + (1− α)q % αp′ + (1− α)q.
3. (Preference for complete hedges) For any finite set of acts f1, . . . , fm
in F such that f1 ∼ fj for all j = 2, . . . ,m, and any constant act
p ∈ ∆(X), if the convex combination α1f1 + · · · + αmfm = p, then
p % f1.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Suppose that for a given mean-dispersion representation (u, pi, ρ, V ) the
corresponding vN-M utility function U satisfies U(∆X) = R. That is, the
representation is unbounded. Then, this assumption and Proposition 2 imply
that Proposition 6 from Grant and Polak (2013) (page 1373) applies for all
ρ ∈ [0, 1], thus yielding the following result.
Proposition 3 If the relation  on F admits a mean-dispersion represen-
tation (u, pi, ρ, V ) with V as in (7), U(∆X) = R, and ρ ∈ [0, 1], then pi is
unique. That is, if there is another representation (u′, pi′, ρ, V ′), then pi = pi′.
Note that the uniqueness of pi would be directly implied from the axioms
if Axiom 4 is strengthened to the unboundedness axiom in Kopylov (2007)
and the critical condition in Axiom 7 is replaced by fpi % f % fpi. In
addition, it can be shown that these modifications simultaneously imply that
preferences are monotone and that they satisfy Schmeidler’s (1989) convexity
axiom and Siniscalchi’s (2009) complementary independence axiom. Thus,
Corollary 3 (c),(d),(e) from Grant and Polak (2013) (page 1369) applies and
the preferences also have an invariant-biseparable representation (Ghirardato
et al., 2004), a vector expected utility representation (Siniscalchi, 2009), and
a multiple priors representation (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989).
4 A Behavioral Test of Bounded Ambiguity
Preference
In some respects, Proposition 1 is surprising since Axiom 7 may seem almost
too weak. Yet in the presence of Axioms 1 through 6, which are fairly
standard, we obtain a novel mean-dispersion representation. Axiom 7 does,
however, involve an existential condition, which may imply difficulties in
terms of observability and testability. In this section we present a behavioral
example in which we can design tests that can be employed to falsify Axiom 7.
Consider the following situation: inform the decision maker that there is
an urn with 100 balls, where each ball is either black or red. There are two
possible states: in state s1, there are 25 black and 75 red balls. In state s2,
there are 75 black and 25 red balls. The decision maker receives $100 if a
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black ball is drawn and $0 if a red ball is drawn. We denote this ambiguous
act by f . There are two objective lotteries in f :
f(s1) := ($100, 0.25; $0, 0.75),
f(s2) := ($100, 0.75; $0, 0.25).
Since there are only two outcomes, we can normalize utilities so that u($100) =
1 and u($0) = 0. Let pi := (pi1, 1 − pi1), with 0 < pi1 < 1, be a probability
distribution across states. The mean-dispersion value of the risk-loving per-
turbed lottery derived from act f is given by:
V
(
fpi
)
= 0.75− 0.50pi21. (11)
Similarly, the mean-dispersion value of the risk-averse perturbed lottery de-
rived from act f is given by:
V
(
f
pi
)
= 0.75− pi1 + 0.50pi21. (12)
Axiom 7 implies that there is some 
pi1 such that f 
pi % f % f 
pi. Let v := V (f),
then we have V
(
f 
pi
) ≥ v ≥ V (f

pi
)
. This implies that we should have
1/4 ≤ v ≤ 3/4. Moreover, using (11) and (12), we obtain√
3
2
− 2v ≥ 
pi1 ≥ 1−
√
2v − 1
2
. (13)
Next, consider an act g defined as:
g(s1) := ($100, 0.75; $0, 0.25),
g(s2) := ($100, 0.25; $0, 0.75).
Thus, g is equivalent to f except that the assignment of lotteries to states
has been reversed. Like with f , we must have g
pi % g % g
pi, which yields
1/4 ≤ 
v ≤ 3/4 and √
2
v − 1
2
≥ 
pi1 ≥ 1−
√
3
2
− 2
v, (14)
where 
v := V (g). From (13) and (14), it follows that√
2
v − 1
2
+
√
2v − 1
2
≥ 1, (15)
12
and √
3
2
− 2v +
√
3
2
− 2
v ≥ 1. (16)
Conditions (15) and (16) provide tests for Axiom 7. First, note that
we can determine v and 
v by using standard methods. For instance, if h1
denotes the act that yields with certainty $100 regardless of the state and
h0 denotes the act that yields with certainty $0 regardless of the state, then
we can use binary search (see Luce and Raiffa, 1989) to behaviorally find
αf ∈ [0, 1] such that f ∼ αfh1+(1−αf )h0. Similarly, we can find αg ∈ [0, 1]
such that g ∼ αgh1 + (1 − αg)h0. It follows2 that v = αf and 
v = αg.
Notice that if either inequality (15) or (16) does not hold, then Axiom 7
cannot be true. This could happen when both v and 
v are less than 3/8 or
both v and 
v are greater than 5/8; in the first case inequality (15) will not
hold and in the second case inequality (16) will not hold. Of course, if both
inequalities hold, then we cannot falsify Axiom 7 in this case, but other acts
can be added as to bound even further the range for 
pi1 and determine if the
additional inequalities are consistent or not. Also, values other than 0.25 and
0.75 can be used in defining the probabilities of the acts f and g.
Finally, note that this approach can be used constructively to elicit 
pi1 (if
it exists) for this example. For instance, if αf and αg turn out to be equal to
1/2 and Axioms 1-7 hold, then 
pi1 must be in the interval [1−
√
1/2,
√
1/2]
(i.e., roughly between 0.293 and 0.707). If αf = αg = 0.4, then 
pi1 must be
roughly in the interval [0.452, 0.548].
5 The Ellsberg Paradox
We include a formal demonstration that representation (10) can resolve Ells-
berg’s (1961) paradox. A similar formal demonstration in the setup involving
second order acts is provided in Schneider and Nunez (2015) for Ellsberg’s
two-color paradox. We apply the mean-dispersion model in the Anscombe-
Aumann framework developed here to resolve Ellsberg’s three-color paradox.
Consider Ellsberg’s three-color paradox in which one chooses between an ob-
jective and a subjective lottery. The agent is told that an urn contains 30
red balls and 60 other balls which are either black or yellow, although the
2If either αf or αg does not exist, then the continuity axiom (Axiom 2) does not hold
independently of whether Axiom 7 holds, but this is a separate issue.
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exact proportion is unknown. The agent is then provided with the following
pair of binary choices:
1. Choose between (a) and (b):
(a) Receive $100 if a red ball is drawn.
(b) Receive $100 if a black ball is drawn.
2. Choose between (a) and (b):
(a) Receive $100 if a red or yellow ball is drawn.
(b) Receive $100 if a black or yellow ball is drawn.
Ellsberg (1961) observed that many people would strictly prefer 1(a) over
1(b), and 2(b) over 2(a), indicating a strict preference for betting on an out-
come with a known probability over an outcome with unknown probability.
Such ambiguity-averse preferences violate the axioms of subjective expected
utility theory. However, such behavior is naturally accommodated by repre-
sentation (10).
To illustrate, we first normalize the utility function such that u($100) = 1
and u($0) = 0. The state space is S = {0, . . . , 60}, where s ∈ S represents the
number of black balls in the urn. Note that s ∈ S fully characterizes the state
of the experiment, since the number of yellow balls is 60− s. We associate
acts f1, f2, f3, and f4 with bets 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), and 2(b), respectively, as
follows:
f1(s) := (1 : 1/3; 0 : 2/3),
f2(s) := (1 : s/90; 0 : 1− s/90),
f3(s) := (1 : 1− s/90; 0 : s/90),
f4(s) := (1 : 2/3; 0 : 1/3),
for all s ∈ S, where the notation (u1 : p1; u2 : p2) represents the utility u1 on
a winning outcome with probability p1 and the utility u2 on a losing outcome
with probability p2 for each of the four acts.
For pi ∈ ∆(S) define
Api :=
60∑
s=0
spis, Bpi :=
60∑
s=0
|Api − s|pis.
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It is easy to see that µ(f1, pi) = 1/3, µ(f2, pi) = Api/90, µ(f3, pi) = 1−Api/90,
and µ(f4, pi) = 2/3. Hence, if a person has preferences f1  f2 and f4  f3,
and a subjective expected utility representation holds for a given pi, we must
simultaneously have µ(f1, pi) > µ(f2, pi) and µ(f4, pi) > µ(f3, pi), which lead
to the contradictory inequalities Api < 30 and Api > 30, respectively.
On the other hand, we can see how Ellsberg’s paradox could be resolved by
the model in Proposition 1 by noticing that r(f1, pi) = 0, r(f2, pi) = Bpi/180,
r(f3, pi) = Bpi/180, and r(f4, pi) = 0. Therefore, V (f1, pi) > V (f2, pi) and
V (f4, pi) > V (f3, pi) will hold for all pi in the set{
pi ∈ ∆(S) : ρBpi
2
> |Api − 30| , pi > 0
}
. (17)
For example, if the decision maker is consistent with Axioms 1-7, and pi
in Axiom 7 corresponds to the uniform distribution pis = 1/61 for all s
or to a distribution close to the uniform distribution, then pi would be in
set (17) and the paradox resolved under representation (10) for any ρ in
(0, 1]. An analogous argument confirms that Ellsberg’s two-color paradox
is also resolved under similar conditions (for any pi close to the uniform
distribution and any ρ in (0, 1]).
6 Conclusion
In this note, we have provided a simple axiomatic approach to mean-dispersion
preferences in the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework in which the disper-
sion function, the utility function, the tradeoff coefficient ρ ∈ [−1, 1], and
the probability distribution pi ∈ ∆(S) are uniquely determined from the ax-
ioms. We subsequently showed that the model explains ambiguity aversion
in Ellsberg’s paradox. We also introduced a behavioral test for our novel
axiom of bounded ambiguity preference. The model presented here comple-
ments the work on mean-dispersion preferences by Grant and Polak (2013),
as well as the class of variational preferences (Maccheroni et al., 2006a,b)
and vector expected utility preferences (Siniscalchi, 2009). While these lat-
ter representations are more general, the model presented here provides a
behavioral foundation for mean-dispersion preferences with a specific form
for the dispersion function which has been largely absent from the literature.
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Appendix: Proofs of Results
Proof of Lemma 1: Let f ∈ F , pi ∈ ∆(S), and ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Then
U(fρ,pi) =
∑
x∈X
fρ,pi(x)u(x)
= (1− ρa)
∑
x∈X
∑
s∈S
pisfs(x)u(x) + (1 + ρa)
∑
x∈X
∑
s∈S
pisfs(x)u(x)
= µ(f, pi)− ρ
(
aµ(f, pi)−
∑
s∈S
∑
x∈X
pisfs(x)u(x)
)
= µ(f, pi)− ρ
∑
s∈S
pis [µ(f, pi)− U(f(s))] ,
where for simplicity we have omitted the dependence of a, a, S and S on f
and pi. Observe that s′ ∈ Spi(f) if and only if f(s′) ≺ fpi, that is, if and only
if
∑
x∈X fs′(x)u(x) < µ(f, pi). Hence, from (6), we get∑
s∈S
pis [µ(f, pi)− U(f(s))] = r(f, pi),
and therefore, U(fρ,pi) = µ(f, pi)− ρr(f, pi).
Proof of Proposition 1: We first prove that Axioms 1 through 7 are suf-
ficient, so let us assume that those axioms hold. From Theorem 1, there exists
a nonconstant affine function u : X → R such that p  q if and only if U(p) >
U(q) for all p, q ∈ ∆(X). From Axiom 7, there exists pi ∈ ∆(S) such that
fpi % f % fpi for all f ∈ F . Hence, from Axiom 2, for each f ∈ F there exists
α ∈ [0, 1] such that f ∼ αf
pi
+(1−α)fpi. Since αfpi+(1−α)fpi ∈ ∆(X), we
can apply Lemma 1 to obtain U(αf
pi
+(1−α)fpi) = µ(f, pi)−(2α−1)r(f, pi).
Now, if we set ρ := 2α − 1, then applying Lemma 1 again we obtain
U(αf
pi
+ (1 − α)fpi) = U(fρ,pi), and from Theorem 1 we conclude f ∼
αf
pi
+ (1 − α)fpi ∼ fρ,pi with ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Thus, for each f ∈ F there
exists ρ ∈ [−1, 1] such that f ∼ fρ,pi.
Next, we show that the following result holds:
r(f, pi) > 0 and fρ,pi ∼ f
ρ,pi ⇒ ρ = 
ρ; (18)
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for all f ∈ F , p ∈ ∆(X), and α ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed, fρ,pi ∼ f
ρ,pi implies U(fρ,pi) =
U(f
ρ,pi), which by Lemma 1 implies (ρ − 
ρ)r(f, pi) = 0. Hence, r(f, pi) > 0
implies ρ = 
ρ and (18) follows.
In particular, result (18) implies that for each f ∈ F , with r(f, pi) > 0,
there is a unique ρ ∈ [−1, 1] such that f ∼ fρ,pi. Moreover, if we define
f (α) := αf + (1 − α)fρ,pi for α ∈ (0, 1], it follows from Axiom 5 that f (α) ∼
fρ,pi. It is easy to see that r(f
(α), pi) = αr(f, pi), and so, r(f, pi) > 0 implies
r(f (α), pi) > 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1]. It is also easy to show that fρ,pi ∼ (f (α))ρ,pi.
Thus, r(f, pi) > 0 implies that there is a unique ρ ∈ [−1, 1] such that f (α) ∼
(f (α))ρ,pi for all α ∈ [0, 1].
Based on the results from the previous paragraph, given f ∈ F with
r(f, pi) > 0, observe that the function v : R2 → R defined as v(x, y) =
y−ρx always takes value U(fρ,pi) on the line segment Lρ(f) joining the points
(r(f, pi), µ(f, pi)) and (0, U(fρ,pi)). This follows from observing that for each
point (x, y) in Lρ(f), that is, a point of the form (x, y) = α(r(f, pi), µ(f, pi))+
(1− α)(0, U(fρ,pi)), there corresponds act f (α) := αf + (1− α)fρ,pi such that
v(x, y) = U((f (α))ρ,pi) = U(fρ,pi). Moreover, let f
′ := βf + (1 − β)p with
p ∈ ∆(X) and fixed β ∈ (0, 1]. The line segment Lρ(f ′) joining points
(r(f ′, pi), µ(f ′, pi)) and (0, U(f ′ρ,pi)) is parallel to Lρ(f) because it has slope
µ(f ′, pi)− U(f ′ρ,pi)
r(f ′, pi)
= ρ =
µ(f, pi)− U(fρ,pi)
r(f, pi)
,
where the right-hand side expression is the slope of Lρ(f). Hence, Lρ(f
′) is
just a geometric translation of Lρ(f). We also have v constant and equal to
U(f ′ρ,pi) = βU(fρ,pi) + (1− β)U(p) on Lρ(f ′).
Now, let f, g ∈ F with f 6∼ g, r(f, pi) > 0, and r(g, pi) > 0. There
exist ρ0, ρ1 ∈ [−1, 1] such that f ∼ fρ0,pi and g ∼ gρ1,pi. Thus, fρ0,pi 6∼ gρ1,pi
and U(fρ0,pi) 6= U(gρ1,pi). Define f (α) := αf + (1 − α)gρ1,pi and g(β) := βg +
(1− β)fρ0,pi for α, β ∈ [0, 1]. As indicated above, Lρ0(f (α)) and Lρ1(g(β)) are
geometric translations (same slope) of the respective line segments Lρ0(f) and
Lρ1(g). Also, notice that for α = β = 1/2, the corresponding line segments
Lρ0(f
(1/2)) and Lρ1(g
(1/2)) meet at point (0, (U(fρ0,pi)+U(gρ1,pi))/2). If the two
line segments Lρ0(f
(1/2)) and Lρ1(g
(1/2)) are not parallel, then by continuity
of the translation of line segments, there exist an infinite number of pairs
(α, β), α 6= β, within a small neighborhood of (1/2, 1/2) in [0, 1]× [0, 1] such
that the line segments Lρ0(f
(α)) and Lρ1(g
(β)) intersect at a unique point.
Choosing any pair (α, β) such that α + β 6= 1 in that neighborhood, the
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respective intersection point corresponds to an act h such that h ∼ f (α) and
h ∼ g(β), from which we obtain f (α) ∼ g(β) and then, (f (α))ρ0,pi ∼ (g(β))ρ1,pi
and U((f (α))ρ0,pi) = U((g
(β))ρ1,pi). But this together with α + β 6= 1 imply
U(fρ0,pi) = U(gρ1,pi), a contradiction. Thus, the line segments Lρ0(f
(1/2)) and
Lρ1(g
(1/2)) are parallel, and so, Lρ0(f) and Lρ1(g) are also parallel. Therefore,
we must have ρ0 = ρ1.
Summarizing, there exists a unique ρ ∈ [−1, 1] such that f ∼ fρ,pi for all
f ∈ F such that r(f, pi) > 0. On the other hand, since pi > 0, if r(f, pi) = 0,
then we have U(f(s)) = µ(f, pi) = U(fpi) for all s ∈ S. Hence, f(s) ∼ fpi for
all s ∈ S and by Axiom 6, we obtain f ∼ fpi. Therefore, f ∼ fpi if and only
if r(f, pi) = 0. It follows that if we define V as
V (f) :=
{
U(fρ,pi) if r(f, pi) > 0,
U(fpi) if r(f, pi) = 0,
then V is well-defined and V (f) = µ(f, pi) − ρr(f, pi) for all f . Moreover,
f  g if and only if exactly one of the following statements holds true
fρ,pi  gρ,pi for r(f, pi) > 0 and r(g, pi) > 0,
fρ,pi  gpi for r(f, pi) > 0 and r(g, pi) = 0,
fpi  gρ,pi for r(f, pi) = 0 and r(g, pi) > 0,
fpi  gpi for r(f, pi) = 0 and r(g, pi) = 0,
if and only if V (f) > V (g).
In the second part of the proof, we need to show that the axioms are
necessary. However, Axioms 1 through 4 are common in the literature and
the proof that they are necessary is standard, so that we omit it. Hence, we
only concentrate on proving the necessity of the non-traditional Axioms 5,
6, and 7.
Notice that f ∼ p implies V (f) = U(p). On the other hand, V (αf +(1−
α)p) = αV (f) + (1− α)U(p) = V (f) = U(p). Hence, αf + (1− α)p ∼ f ∼ p
and Axiom 5 follows. Next, notice that if f(s) ∼ g(s) for all s ∈ S, then
U(f(s)) = U(g(s)) for all s. It follows that µ(f, pi) = µ(g, pi) and r(f, pi) =
r(g, pi). Hence, V (f) = V (g) and so, f ∼ g and Axiom 6 follows. Finally, for
any act f we have V (f) = U(fρ,pi) = V (fρ,pi), which implies f ∼ fρ,pi. On the
other hand, as indicated in (8), we clearly have fpi % fρ,pi % fpi, from which
we obtain fpi % f % fpi, and the statement of Axiom 7 also holds.
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For the rest of this section we denote by e the all-ones vector and by
ek the k-th canonical vector in Rn. We denote by δij the Kronecker delta
function, that is, δij = 0 if i 6= j and δij = 1 if i = j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Lemma 2 Given ρ ∈ [0, 1] and a vector β ∈ Rn such that β ≥ 0 and
βT e = 1, let v : Rn → R be the following real-valued function:
v(x) := βTx− ρ
2
n∑
i=1
βi
∣∣βTx− xi∣∣ .
Then, v is monotone. That is,
x ≤ y implies v(x) ≤ v(y),
for all x, y in Rn.
Proof. First, given any x ∈ Rn, λ ≥ 0, and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we prove that
v(x+ λek) ≥ v(x). Notice that the result is obviously true for λ = 0, so that
we assume λ > 0. Consider the following sets of indexes
A := {j : βTx > xj},
B := {j : βTx+ λβk > xj + λδjk}.
It is easy to show that A \ {k} ⊂ B and if k /∈ A then k /∈ B. Hence,
v(x+ λek) = β
T (x+ λek)− ρ
2
n∑
i=1
βi
∣∣βT (x+ λek)− (xi + λδik)∣∣
= βTx+ λβk − ρ
∑
i∈B
βi
(
βTx− xi + λ(βk − δik)
)
= βTx+ λβk
(
1− ρ
∑
i∈B
βi
)
− ρ
∑
i∈B
βi
(
βTx− xi − λδik
)
If k /∈ A, then
v(x+ λek) = v(x) + λβk
(
1− ρ
∑
i∈B
βi
)
− ρ
∑
i∈B\A
βi
(
βTx− xi
) ≥ v(x).
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If k ∈ A and k ∈ B, then
v(x+λek) = v(x)+ρλβk+λβk
(
1− ρ
∑
i∈B
βi
)
−ρ
∑
i∈B\A
βi
(
βTx− xi
) ≥ v(x).
If k ∈ A and k /∈ B, then
v(x+λek) = v(x)+ρβk
(
βTx− xk
)
+λβk
(
1− ρ
∑
i∈B
βi
)
−ρ
∑
i∈B\A
βi
(
βTx− xi
) ≥ v(x).
Therefore, we always get v(x + λek) ≥ v(x) in all cases. To conclude the
proof, notice that when x ≤ y we can write
y =
1
n
n∑
k=1
(x+ λkek) ,
where λk := n(yk−xk) ≥ 0 for all k. From the previous result, we know that
v(x+ λkek) ≥ v(x) for all k. Hence, since v is a concave function, we obtain
v(x) ≤ 1
n
n∑
k=1
v (x+ λkek) ≤ v
(
1
n
n∑
k=1
(x+ λkek)
)
= v(y),
and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2: Property 1 follows from Lemma 2 by taking
n := |S|, xs := U(f(s)) and ys := U(g(s)) for all s ∈ S, and β := pi. Since
f(s) % g(s) for all s, we obtain x ≥ y, which implies V (f) = v(x) ≥ v(y) =
V (g), and so f % g. Property 2 follows by noticing that αf + (1 − α)p %
αp′ + (1− α)p implies αV (f) + (1− α)U(p) ≥ αU(p′) + (1− α)U(p), which
implies αV (f)+ (1−α)U(q) ≥ αU(p′)+ (1−α)U(q), which yields αf +(1−
α)q % αp′ + (1− α)q. Finally, Property 3 follows from noticing that f1 ∼ fj
for all j implies V (f1) = V (fj) for all j. Moreover, α1f1 + · · · + αmfm = p
implies V (α1f1 + · · ·+ αmfm) = U(p), but since V is concave on F , we have
V (α1f1 + · · · + αmfm) ≥ α1V (f1) + · · · + αmV (fm) = V (f1). Therefore,
U(p) ≥ V (f1) and hence, p % f1.
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